RIP IPE by Cammack, Paul
RIP IPE
Paul Cammack
Manchester Metropolitan University
Acknowledgements
I am particularly grateful to Greig Charnock and Stuart Shields for their comments
Papers in the Politics of Global Competitiveness, No. 7, May 2007
RIP IPE
'Theory is always for someone and for some purpose', 
Robert Cox (1981: 128).
Introduction
The article from which this frequently cited maxim is taken (Cox, 1981) is the 
founding document of critical IPE. It adopts a flawed position that the approach 
has never overcome, stemming from its simplistic contrast between 'problem-
solving' and 'critical' theory, and the misunderstanding and underestimation of 
liberal  problem-solving  theory  arising  from it.  Taking  two recent  attempts  to 
breathe new life into IPE (Payne 2005a, Phillips, 2005a) as indicative, I argue 
that critical IPE still reflects and reproduces these flaws, and has not pursued let 
alone progressed beyond the agenda set out by Cox. Instead, it has allowed itself 
to be hegemonised by 'US' IPE, and has come to serve its empire-building and 
ideological  purposes.  In short,  it  is  defunct;  it  has ceased to be critical,  and 
should be pronounced dead and left to rest in peace.
Critical IPE, 1981-2005
Cox prefaced his attempt to “sketch a method for understanding global power 
relations” (1981: 128) by drawing attention to the emergence in global politics of 
new actors (“different kinds of states, and non-state entities”) and new issues 
(“low as well as high politics”). States could no longer be considered in isolation 
from their domestic or social attributes; and as the distinction between state and 
civil  society was  constitutive of international relations theory, IR could neither 
recognise  the  state-society  complex  as  “the  basic  entity  of  international 
relations”, nor explore “the prospect that there exist a plurality of forms of state, 
expressing different configurations of state/society complexes” (ibid: 127). On 
this basis, Cox ended his prefatory remarks with three 'warnings':
look at the problem of world order in the whole, but beware of reifying 
a world system. Beware of underrating state power, but in addition 
give proper attention to social forces and processes and see how they 
relate to the development of states and world orders. Above all, do not 
base theory on theory but rather on changing practice and empirical-
historical  study,  which  are  a  proving  ground  for  concepts  and 
hypotheses (128).
That was where critical IPE was in 1981, and where at best it remains today. 
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Thus Phillips begins by accepting that the study of IPE “remains entrenched in a 
highly  specific  and  narrow  set  of  theoretical,  conceptual  and  empirical 
foundations” (2005b: 1), and that these derive from its continuing privileging of 
the  past  and present  experience  of  the  core triad  of  advanced industrialized 
economies. She then reproduces Cox's 1981 programme point for point: where 
Cox called for a focus on 'world order as a whole', Phillips calls for a perspective 
that can “encompass and account for the whole of the global political economy 
and the nature of  its  constitution”  (Phillips,  2005b: 1);  where  Cox called  for 
greater attention to comparative political economy (Cox, 1981: ft 36, 154-5), 
Phillips wants a “constructive engagement” with it (Phillips, 2005b: 10); where 
Cox rejected the division between the domestic and the international,  Phillips 
laments IR's “profound bifurcation of the study of domestic politics and the study 
of  international  politics”  (ibid:  15);  where  Cox  advised  against  excessive 
structuralism, Phillips advocates a “project of meshing structure and agency” in 
order to overcome “the excessive structuralism and economism that have widely 
been deemed to be characteristic of IPE” (Phillips, 2005e, 255); and where Cox 
advocated attention to the agency of social forces, Phillips enters her plea for a 
focus on “the social, as well as the territorial, nature of the key fault lines in the 
global political economy” (ibid: 267). Nothing, it seems, has changed.
With so much to be done, though, the project of 'Globalizing IPE' is surprisingly 
modest in scope. It is “conceived as identifying an agenda and a direction for its 
further development, but not as requiring or inviting a single strategy for doing 
so”: all that is possible for the time being is “to begin to construct ideas about 
the core foundations on which a 'reworked' IPE might come to rest” (Phillips, 
2005e: 246). So a project that begins with the assertion that “there remains 
very little consensus on what IPE is actually about, and what its core concerns, 
characteristics and contributions are or should be” (Phillips, 2005b: 11) ends by 
declining, on principle, to develop a clearly articulated theoretical position of its 
own. Its opponents  are hardly likely to be quaking in their boots.
The judgement that critical IPE has not progressed since 1981 is emphatically 
confirmed  by  Payne's  contribution  to  the  same  collection.  After  reviewing  a 
number of approaches to global governance, he claims no more than that the 
best work on this theme within IPE has provided “a sense of the interlinking of 
structure and agency”, and that “IPE, in short, has established that globalization 
is being governed” (Payne, 2005b, 78-9). As to just how it is being governed, he 
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is more circumspect:
From  that  basis,  however,  an  important,  and  as  yet  unanswered, 
question arises, namely: what kind of world order, politically speaking, 
does  this  apparatus  of  governance  constitute?  To  be  fair,  it  is  a 
question which IPE cannot at the moment be expected to answer. ... It 
is apparent that the old image of a Westphalian system of states, each 
ruled  from  the  top  down  by  a  government  operating  largely  in 
command mode, will no longer suffice. Indeed, it probably never did. It 
is equally apparent that world government remains a fanciful prospect. 
What falls in between? We do not know (ibid: 79).
The question of world order a question which IPE cannot be expected to answer? 
But  this  was  the question  that  Cox  set  out  to  answer,  in  1981.  Hence  his 
recommendation, cited above, to start with “the problem of world order in the 
whole.” And his starting point was that “the old image of a Westphalian system 
of states” would no longer suffice. How has it come about, then, that after a 
quarter of a century critical IPE is so bereft of ideas, and so little able to take its 
own original project forward? The answer to that question begins with the flawed 
contrast that Cox drew at the outset between problem-solving theory on the one 
hand, and critical theory on the other.
'Me-clever-you-stupid':1 critical versus problem-solving theory
Cox's contrast between problem-solving theory and critical theory consists of a 
set of points common to all theory, and a point-by-point contrast between the 
two types. It merits closer critical attention than it has hitherto received. Its first 
element consists of a six-point model of theory in general: (1) it is (as we have 
seen)  'always  for someone  and  for some  purpose';  (2)  it  always  has  a 
perspective,  a  standpoint  from  which  the  world  is  seen;  however,  (3) 
“sophisticated theory is never just the expression of a perspective”; the more 
sophisticated it is, “the more it reflects upon and transcends its own perspective” 
(ibid: 128); (4) the “enveloping world” raises issues for each such perspective, 
“pressures  of  social  reality”  which  “present  themselves  to  consciousness  as 
problems”, and of which theory must become aware; so (5) “as reality changes, 
old concepts have to be adjusted or rejected and new concepts forged in an 
initial  dialogue between the theorist  and the particular world he (sic) tries to 
comprehend”; and (6) “this initial dialogue concerns the problematic proper with 
a particular perspective”;2 social and political theory, always history-bound at its 
1 I have borrowed this fine phrase from Steve Smith (2000: 379)
2 In later versions of this statement, 'with' is corrected to 'within'.
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origin, “attempts to transcend the particularity of its historical origins in order to 
place them within the framework of some general propositions or laws” (ibid). 
Two points of significance emerge here. The first (a familiar and uncontentious 
claim) is that no social or political theory can claim to be value-free. The second, 
less  often remembered,  is  that  all theory  proceeds  by confronting  'problems' 
thrown up by the enveloping world. For Cox, the difference between 'problem-
solving'  theory  and 'critical'  theory is  not that  one solves 'problems'  and the 
other does not. It hangs, rather, on the purpose that theory serves:
Beginning with its problematic, theory can serve two distinct purposes. 
One  is  a  simple,  direct  response:  to  be  a  guide  to  help  solve  the 
problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective which 
was  the  point  of  departure.  The  other  is  more  reflective  upon  the 
process of theorising itself: to become clearly aware of the perspective 
which gives rise to theorising, and its relation to other perspectives (to 
achieve a perspective on perspectives); and to open up the possibility 
of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic 
becomes one of creating an alternative world. Each of these purposes 
gives rise to a different kind of theory (ibid).
Problem-solving  theory,  in  accordance  with  this  distinction,  has  six  key 
characteristics: (1) “it takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and 
power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the 
given framework for action” (ibid); (2) its aim is “to make these relationships 
and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of 
trouble”  (ibid:  129);  (3)  because  it  does  not  call  “the  general  pattern  of 
institutions and relationships” into question it is  fragmentary, with each theory 
dealing with a single problem area, and assuming that other parts of the system 
remain the same; (4) it is “non-historical or ahistorical, since it, in effect, posits 
a continuing present (the permanence of the institutions and power relations that 
constitute its parameters)”: “it posits a fixed order as its point of reference”; (5), 
then, such theories can be represented as “serving particular national, sectional, 
or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order”; and (6) “the 
purpose served by problem-solving theory is conservative” (ibid).
In contrast, critical theory (1) “stands apart from the prevailing order of the 
world and asks how that order came about”; (2) it “does not take institutions and 
social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning 
itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of 
changing”; (3) it is directed “to the social and political complex as a whole rather 
than to the separate parts”; (4) it is “theory of history in the sense of being 
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concerned  not  just  with  the  past  but  with  a  continuing  process  of  historical 
change” (ibid); (5), then, it not only “allows for a normative choice in favour of a 
social and political order different from the prevailing order”, but also “limits the 
range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the 
existing world”; and (6) it can be “a guide to strategic action for bringing about 
an  alternative  order,  whereas  problem-solving  theory  is  a  guide  to  tactical 
actions which, intended or unintended, sustain the existing order” (ibid: 130). 
It is ironic that self-professed critical theorists have lapped up this so obviously 
spurious formulation so uncritically. What is presented as a contrast between two 
approaches  to  theory  turns  out  to  be  a  contrast  between  two  political 
orientations – support for and opposition to the status quo respectively.  It is 
constructed on the basis that supporters of the status quo cannot reason about 
their broader circumstances, or question any element of the institutional order 
they support. In this Manichean world view, to be a supporter of the prevailing 
order precludes reflecting on that order as a whole and the social and power 
relations and institutions involved in it and how they came about; or recognising 
that some challenging changes are taking place, and adapting in order to protect 
core interests. On one side Cox puts the automatic and unreflecting defence of 
the existing order; on the other, the stipulation that being reflective must entail 
opting for an alternative. To see an alternative but prefer the status quo is ruled 
out. Problem-solvers are assumed to recognise and deal with a problem in part 
of the system without worrying themselves either with what the state is of the 
system as a whole, or how it got to be the way it is. Critical theorists, in contrast, 
are not only uniquely blessed with an awareness of alternatives, but are able to 
discern which of them are “feasible transformations of the existing world”. In 
short, critical theorist are clever, and problem solvers are stupid. Lurking behind 
all this is a contrast familiar from Marxist debate at the time: the suggestion that 
problem-solvers  are  the  mere  instruments  of  existing  interests,  while  critical 
theorists have a degree of distance, or autonomy, from them. 
Naïve and implausible though it is, this consolatory contrast continues to shape 
critical IPE's perception of itself. Central to it is the suggestion that the problems 
thrown  up  by  the  'enveloping  world'  over  the  last  fifty  years  –  such  as 
decolonisation,  Third  World  revolutions  and nationalism,  global  inflation,  debt 
crisis,  Japanese and East Asian development, and the break-up of the Soviet 
Union to name but a few – represent a 'status quo' that has simply required the 
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routine and unreflective attention to discrete areas of policy on the part of those 
set  on preserving  the  existing  order.  This  reflects  the conflation  of  two very 
different propositions. The first is that much social and political theory is oriented 
towards and placed at the service of the 'dominant interest'. The second is that 
the  'dominant  interest'  is  transparent,  monolithic,  and  unchanging.  The  first 
proposition  has  an  unmistakeably  Marxist  pedigree.  The  second,  ironically, 
reflects a neo-realist view of the world.
The road not taken
In retrospect (not surprisingly in view of the twenty-five years he spent at the 
ILO), the strongest contribution made by Cox to the enterprise of “understanding 
global power relations” stems from his early grasp and first-hand knowledge of 
the changing  institutional terrain of the global political economy in the 1970s, 
reflected in what he (along with others) calls the internationalization of the state. 
Phillips and her collaborators recognize this, without apparently realizing at the 
same time the irony of appealing to this now as the appropriate starting point for 
a  renewed IPE  (Phillips,  2005d,  110-111).  Characteristically,  they  make  this 
appeal without exploring the specific  content of Cox's  analysis,  to which it  is 
worth  returning.  It  reflects  his  particular  experience  as  an  international  civil 
servant working in Geneva, first in positions close to ILO Director-General David 
Morse, a US national, then as director of the International Institute for Labour 
Studies (Cox, 1996: 22-6), in an intellectually rich environment in which radical 
ideas circulated freely. Cox's experience prompted philosophical and theoretical 
enquiries  that  laid  the  foundations  for  his  later  work.  But  it  is  of  greater 
significance that he was present at the creation of an environment in which the 
assertion of US power within the post-war world order was being complemented, 
and to some degree modulated, by the emerging regulatory role of international 
organisations. The nuanced view of this moment in the evolution of the post-war 
world order, rather than the theoretical/philosophical framework within which it 
was then and later set, is Cox's most valuable contribution.
Noting  that  the  post-war  hegemony  of  pax  americana was  more  fully 
institutionalised than the  pax britannica that had preceded it, Cox provided an 
account of an emerging new world order that integrated a perspective on the 
global  political  economy with  changes  taking  place  at  the  level  of  individual 
states throughout the system as a whole. Following James Petras, he described 
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this emerging new world order as an “imperial state system”:
1. The  spread  of  capitalist  production  relations  has  generated  “new 
social  forces  in  the  periphery”  (ibid:  143),  and  given  rise  to  an 
imperial state system composed of a dominant imperial state and a 
number of subordinate collaborator states.
2. The  imperial  state  is  not  the  whole  US  government  but  “those 
executive  bodies  within  the  'government'  which  are  charged  with 
promoting  and  protecting  the  expansion  of  capital  across  state 
boundaries” (ibid, citing Petras).
3. This part of the US government is at the system's core, together ... 
with  inter-state  institutions  such  as  the  IMF and the  World  Bank, 
symbiotically  related  to  expansive  capital,  and  with  collaborator 
governments (or at any rate parts of them linked to the system) in 
the system's periphery.
4. “The state is thus a necessary but insufficient category to account for 
the imperial system”. It is the imperial system itself (“a world order 
structure  drawing support  from a particular  configuration  of  social 
forces, national and transnational, and of core and periphery states”) 
that is “the starting point of enquiry” (ibid: 144).
5. The  imperial  system  includes  some  formal  and  less  formal 
organisations at the system level through which pressures on states 
can  be  exerted  without  these  system  level  organisations  actually  
usurping state power (emphasis mine).
In sum, “the behaviour of particular states or of organised economic and social 
interests ... finds its meaning in the larger totality of the imperial system” (ibid). 
Cox explicitly follows contemporary Marxist debates here.3 But he complements 
them  with  an  institutional  analysis  that  brings  together  the  “machinery  of 
surveillance”  developed  by  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank  and  an  “elaborate 
machinery for the harmonisation of national policies” in what has become “an 
acquired  habit  of  mutual  consultation  and  mutual  review  of  national  policies 
(through the OECD and other agencies)” (ibid: 145).4 In sum,
such  an  internationalised  policy  process  presupposed  a  power 
structure, one in which central agencies of the US government were in 
a dominant position. But it was not necessarily an entirely hierarchical  
power structure with lines of force running exclusively from the top  
down,  nor  was it  one within  which the units  of  action  were  whole  
3 For all its merits, though, the discussion summarised here is no more than a dim 
reflection of debates over the previous decade and more, principally among European 
and Third World Marxists, writing as much in French, German and Spanish as in 
English. Murray (1971) is an early contribution; Camilleri (1981), published at the 
same time as Cox's essay, reflects the nature of the Marxist debate; and Cox (1977, 
esp. fts 9-12) and Cox (1979) that Cox was familiar with these debates.
4 This relevance of this formulation to the EU's Open Method of Co-ordination, as a 
prime example of a means by which pressures on states can be exerted without 
actually usurping state power, is clear.
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nation states. It was a power structure seeking to maintain consensus 
through  bargaining  and  one  in  which  the  bargaining  units  were 
fragments of states (ibid; emphasis mine).
On the basis of this overall appraisal, Cox identifies a number of features of the 
'global governance of capitalism' that have a strikingly contemporary ring:
1. “State structures appropriate to this process of policy harmonisation 
can be contrasted with those of the welfare nationalist state of the 
preceding period” (ibid: 145-6).
2. “The  internationalisation  of  the  state  gives  precedence  to  certain 
state agencies – notably ministries of finance and prime minister's 
offices  –  which  are  key  points  in  the  adjustment  of  domestic  to 
international economic policy” (ibid: 146).
3. “A new axis of influence linked international policy networks with the 
key central agencies of government and with big business. This new 
informal  corporative  structure  overshadowed  the  older  more 
formalised national corporatism and reflected the dominance of the 
sector  oriented  to  the  world  economy  over  the  more  nationally-
oriented sector of a country's economy”
4. “The  internationalisation  of  the  state  is  not,  of  course,  limited  to 
advanced capitalist core countries. It would not be difficult to make a 
catalogue of recent cases in peripheral countries where institutions of 
the world economy, usually  as a condition for  debt renewal,  have 
dictated  policies  which  could  only  be  sustained  by  a  coalition  of 
conservative forces” (ibid).
5. In  this  context,  “a  major  problem  for  international  capital  in  its 
aspiration  for  hegemony  is  how  to  neutralise  the  effect  of  [the] 
marginalisation of perhaps one third of the world's population so as to 
prevent its poverty from fuelling revolt” (ibid: 149).
The model sketched out here has four significant features. First, it reflects the 
debates current at the time in European intellectual circles and on the US left, 
strongly  influenced  by  such  'Third  World'  contributors  as  Samir  Amin,  and 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto. Second, it owes nothing to the 
contrast  between problem-solving and critical  theory,  nor does it  respect  the 
presentation earlier in the essay of ideas, institutions and material capabilities 
and social forces, states and world orders as reciprocally related in indeterminate 
ways. Instead, it offers an integrated conjunctural analysis which starts with the 
current structure of global capitalism and the interests dominant within it, and 
sees institutional  change as arising out of class struggle, mediated by states. 
Third,  it  disposes  of  the  idea  that  a  Waltzian  neo-realist  paradigm could  be 
usefully applied to the governance of global capitalism, and offers a framework of 
analysis far superior to that concurrently being developed by Keohane and his 
associates. And fourth, it succeeds in describing a 'world order” which is neither 
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“the old image of a Westphalian system of states”, nor “world government”, but 
“something in between” – and it does it in considerable empirical detail. 
Here, then, was an excellent starting point for an holistic understanding of the 
global  political  economy, which was capable of  linking class,  state and world 
order,  and at  the  same time  able  to  place  specific  processes  of  institutional 
change in that broader context. Whatever happened next? First, critical theorists 
fell into the trap of “basing theory on theory”, and in particular of expending time 
and energy on  a  protracted debates  with an already superseded and largely 
irrelevant neorealism. This was ironic, as Waltz had cheerfully declared at the 
outset that he had no interest in capitalism, and that his theory was not designed 
to address it. The appropriate response would have been to say “You just don't 
get  it”,  and  move  on.  Second,  in  so  far  as  they  undertook  the  “empirical 
historical  study  of  changing  practice,”  they  fell  into  the  error  of  global 
instrumentalism, deploying the idea of a “transnational managerial class” (Cox, 
1981: 147) rather than preserving the crucial distinction between class forces on 
the one hand, and relatively autonomous states and international organisations 
on the other. What they did  not do was to develop a research agenda of their 
own based on the broader and more nuanced account given by Cox of the social 
and institutional aspects of the evolution of the global political economy under 
the aegis of the 'imperial state'. Instead, in an act of dereliction, they left this 
task largely to the 'problem-solvers'  they derided as unable to recognise and 
respond to change. The next section explores this major irony.
Misunderestimating 'problem-solving theory'
As we have seen, Cox's contrast between problem-solving and critical theory is 
fundamentally flawed. As a result, he both misunderstands and underestimates 
'problem-solving theory',  with fatal  consequences for the enterprise of critical 
IPE.  If  we  focus instead on the extent  to which academic and policy-making 
'supporters of the status quo' have responded to the circumstances identified by 
Cox and others – the need to manage as far as possible an emerging  global 
capitalist economy characterized by diverse centres of accumulation and varied 
social  and  domestic  conflicts  around  them  –  the  picture  that  emerges  is 
devastating for the pretensions of critical IPE. For on any sober analysis, it is the 
'problem-solvers', or the supporters of global capitalism as a project, who have 
been the more reflective, the more willing to question existing institutions and 
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power relations, the more capable of taking a holistic view, the more willing to 
embrace  and  promote  change,  the  more  able  to  articulate  and  advance  a 
normative  choice  in  favour  of  an  alternative  order  within  the  limits  of  the 
possible,  and  therefore  the  more  able  to  devise  and  implement  a  strategic 
programme through which it can be pursued. 
Recall first Cox's characterisation of the 'global politics of uneven development' 
in  1981.  Set  in  the  context  of  the  'imperial  system',  it  endorsed  a  'core-
periphery'  model,  and concluded,  as noted above, that  “a  major problem for 
international capital in its aspiration for hegemony is how to neutralise the effect 
of [the] marginalisation of perhaps one third of the world's population so as to 
prevent its poverty from fuelling revolt” (above, p. 8). At that time, he saw three 
possible forms that a new world order might take: “a new hegemony ... based on 
the  global  structure  of  social  power  generated  by  the  internationalising  of 
production;” “a non-hegemonic world structure of conflicting power centres;” or 
(rather less likely) “the development of a counter-hegemony based on a Third 
World  coalition  against  core  country  dominance  and  aiming  towards  the 
autonomous  development  of  peripheral  countries  and  the  termination  of  the 
core-peripheral relationship” (ibid: 149-50). The first of these three, if achieved, 
would have four related elements:
1. “A continuance of monetarism as the orthodoxy of economic policy, 
emphasising the stabilisation of the world economy (anti-inflationary 
policies and stable exchange rates) over the fulfilment of domestic 
socio-political  demands  (the  reduction  of  employment  and  the 
maintenance of real wages levels)”.
2. An  “inter-state  power  configuration”  in  the  form  of  “a  coalition 
centring upon the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and Japan, with the support of other OECD states, the co-optation of 
a  few  of  the  more  industrialised  Third  World  countries,  and  the 
possibility  of  revived détente allowing for  a greater  linkage of  the 
Soviet sphere into the world economy of international production”.
3. “Social  conflict  in  the  core  countries  would  be  combatted  through 
enterprise corporatism, though many would be left  unprotected by 
this  mechanism,  particularly  the  non-established  workers.  In  the 
peripheral  countries,  social  conflict  would  be  contained  through  a 
combination of state corporatism and repression”.
4. The “controlling social  force” in the Third World would be a “state 
class” - “a combination of party, bureaucratic and military personnel 
and union leaders, mostly petty bourgeois in origin, which controls 
the  state  apparatus  and  through  it  attempt  [sic]  to  gain  greater 
control over the productive apparatus in the country”. Such a state 
class could be conservative or radical, but if the former, it would be 
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“susceptible to incorporation into a new hegemonic world economy, 
and  to  the  maintenance  of  state  corporatist  structures  as  the 
domestic counterpart to international capital” (ibid: 149-151). 
As noted, this was only one of three possible scenarios sketched out by Cox. I 
set it out at length because I wish to address it in relation to his closing remarks 
in the earlier section of the essay, on problem-solving and critical theory:
The perspectives of different historical periods favour one or the other 
kind of theory. Periods of apparent stability or fixity in power relations 
favour  the  problem-solving  approach.  ...  However,  a  condition  of 
uncertainty  in  power  relations  beckons  to  critical  theory.  Thus  the 
events of  the 1970s generated a sense of  greater fluidity in power 
relationships,  of  a  many  faceted  crisis,  crossing  the  threshold  of 
uncertainty  and opening  the  opportunity  for  a  new development  of 
critical theory directed to the problems of world order (ibid: 130).
What might we conclude? First, the period in question was not one of stability or 
fixity,  but  of  crisis  and  uncertainty.  There  was  no  settled  hegemony,  and 
certainly  no settled and stable 'status  quo'.  Second,  as emerges clearly  from 
Cox's  account,  some potential  'new world  orders'  were discernible,  but  all of 
them would have to be fought for and brought about, if at all, by devising and 
implementing  a  strategic  programme  to  which  the  promotion  of  purposive 
institutional change on the basis of an holistic analysis of the conjuncture would 
be central. The supposed contrast between problem-solving and critical theory is 
of no relevance here, and it is not surprising that Cox does not return to it. Third, 
if the distinction is nevertheless to be maintained, the only conclusion that can 
be reached is that the various forces supportive of a new hegemony based on the 
global structure of social power generated by the internationalising of production 
have proved far better 'critical theorists' than the critical theorists themselves. 
They have succeeded beyond the wildest expectations of either supporters or 
opponents  of  global  capitalism in  building  a  new hegemony around orthodox 
economic policy and the containment of socio-political domestic demands, on the 
basis of a coalition of advanced and advancing capitalist states among which the 
US and the UK have tended to predominate. They have built on the aspects of 
the  “internationalisation  of  the  state”  detailed  by  Cox  to  construct  new  and 
enhanced methods of surveillance and policy transfer, up to and including the 
'open method of co-ordination', principally through the increasingly co-ordinated 
activity  of  old  and new international  organisations  (Cammack 2004a,  2004b, 
2006b,  2006c,  2007).  Beyond  this,  they  have  extended  the  hegemony  of 
capitalist competitiveness to UN agencies that previously sustained alternative 
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and even radical  agendas (Cammack, 2006a).  In addition,  they have sought, 
with some success, “to neutralise the effect of [the] marginalisation of perhaps 
one third of the world's population so as to prevent its poverty from fuelling 
revolt”, by devising and implementing means of containing social conflict in the 
'core' and the 'periphery' that Cox did not envisage, through the introduction of 
new  techniques  of  neo-liberal  discipline  everywhere,  and  the  promotion  of 
transitions  to  democracy  in  the  'Third  World',  the  former  Soviet  Union  and 
Central  and Eastern Europe. The new techniques of neoliberal  discipline have 
generally  displaced rather  than rested upon enterprise  corporatism and state 
corporatism in the core and the periphery respectively; indeed, they have been 
presented ideologically as 'emancipation' and 'empowerment' precisely through a 
critique of corporatism in general, and state corporatism, or the 'state class' in 
particular.  And in the internal  critique of  the 'Washington consensus'  and the 
early  1990s  IMF  imposition  of  financial  and  monetary  discipline,  and  the 
development  of  new  strategies  premised  on  social  engineering  conducive  to 
capitalist expansion (Stiglitz and the World Bank's “deep interventionism”, Stern 
and the EBRD/World Bank's promotion of “investment climates”, and Cotis  and 
the OECD's promotion of new sites of global capitalist accumulation), the 'organic 
intellectuals' of the hegemony of global competitiveness have shown themselves 
capable of both reflection and the promotion of change in social institutions and 
global power relations (Cammack, 2006c). In sum, critical theorists have badly 
misunderestimated 'problem-solving theory', and have been left on the sidelines 
as a result.
How to Lose a War of Position
Ironically, in view of their admittedly indirect Gramscian connections, the critical 
theorists  discussed  here  have  dissipated  their  energies  in  a  losing  war  of 
position, because they have proved unable to follow an agenda of their own. A 
quarter of a century on, critical IPE continues to define itself in opposition to neo-
realist  IR,  1979  vintage  (Phillips,  2005b:  2-5);  its  target  is  still  “the  IR 
community”, as it was for Susan Strange, and it continues, on its own admission, 
to reinforce “US intellectual hegemony in the field of IPE” (ibid: 13). 
If one contrasts the orientation of 'problem-solving' practitioners in the global 
political economy with the stasis of critical IPE, then, one sees that Cox's claims 
regarding the poverty of problem-solving theory are entirely false. Ironically, and 
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to the shame of critical IPE, it has been the mainstream 'problem-solvers' who 
have focused their attention on 'world order as a whole', extended their gaze 
beyond the advanced industrial  core to  all the states in the global  economy, 
explored  in  detail  the  domestic  underpinnings  of  insertion  into  the  global 
capitalist economy, recognised the centrality of the agency of both states and 
social forces, and identified, if only to the extent that their purpose requires, the 
implications  of  different  configurations  of  state-society  complexes.  They  have 
done so in pursuit of a particular project, which I characterise as the promotion 
of  a global  capitalist  economy centred on the logic  of  competitiveness.  In so 
doing, they have not generally bothered themselves with IPE at all, critical or 
otherwise.  But  their  theory  has  certainly  been  'for someone,  and for some 
purpose'. As must always be noted, in developing and applying it they have not 
abolished  the  inherent  contradictions  of  capitalism.  If  anything,  they  have 
brought them more to the fore. But it is self-deluding to argue, given the way 
the world is going, that their understandings of the nature and functioning of the 
global political economy are inferior to those of critical IPE. Exponents of critical 
IPE have been stuck in a time-warp, huddled in a corner facing the wall  and 
indignantly rehearsing the failings of mainstream theory while it has 'globalized', 
to some purpose, behind their backs. 
In sum, critical IPE set off early down the wrong path, and is now hopelessly 
lost as a consequence. If it is not today just where it was in 1981, it is because it 
took a step backwards when Cox unwisely accepted the invitation to engage with 
the emerging IPE orthodoxy in the US academy on its own terms, and thereby to 
validate it. Cox's position, initially shaped in part at least by fruitful interaction 
with contemporary debates on imperialism and class politics, swiftly succumbed 
to the hegemonic strategy of  the institutionally  powerful  'new IPE',  a  fate to 
which it was all the more vulnerable on account of its hybrid character. Its role 
ever  since  has  been  to  represent  the  'alternative'  to  the  mainstream.  By 
recognising  and  validating  the  liberal  position  by  accommodating  itself  to  it, 
critical IPE furthered its hegemonic advance. 
Phillips not only continues to perform this role, but goes further, by taking on 
the duty of “policing the dangerous borders of the social-science enterprise”, to 
borrow another felicitous phrase from Steve Smith (2000: 389).5 Having situated 
herself in a field stretching from traditional IR at one end to neo-Gramscianism 
5 Phillips cites Smith on this very point (2005b: 13), but does not feel implicated.
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at the other (neither Marx nor Gramsci themselves feature in the bibliography of 
Globalizing  International  Political  Economy) she  dutifully  echoes  the  ritual 
denunciation  of  Marxism  prevalent  in  the  UK  and  US  academies  as 
hyperglobalist,  economistic  and  deterministic:  “Orthodox  liberal  and  orthodox 
Marxist accounts jostle with each other on the hyperglobalist terrain, generating 
fundamentally  different  interpretations  of  the  nature  and  significance  of 
contemporary  globalization,  but  often  sharing  economistic  and  determinist 
streaks  at  the  heart  of  their  analyses”  (Phillips,  2005b:  34).  The  charge  is 
repeated later (Phillips, 2005d: 92), but in neither case is any illustrative Marxist 
work identified, despite the jostling crowds apparently involved.6 The effect is to 
draw a line between (included) 'neo-Gramscians', who may be assimilated to the 
debate which reinforces the mainstream, and (excluded) 'Gramscians' and other 
assorted Marxists, who cannot be tolerated (Shields, 2006).
The argument made here, then, is that project of 'globalizing' IPE repeats and 
compounds the mistakes of the first critical IPE, and is likely as a result to repeat 
its experience – to be absorbed and neutralised by the US academy to which it 
orients itself and pays homage. Payne (2005a) confirms this diagnosis, in a text 
that affects to embrace 'watery Marxism' (Payne, 2005a:18), but actually waters 
down critical IPE. First, he makes the obligatory point of marking and observing 
the  line  that  excludes  from  consideration  the  Marxist  and  Marxist-influenced 
writing  with  which  Cox  initially  engaged.  At  the  end  of  his  discussion  of 
contending ideas, he comments that
we should perhaps note the bodies of thought that we did not need to 
revisit:  the  longstanding  systems  of  ideas  that  once  posed  the 
toughest of radical challenges to the mainstream, namely, dependency 
theory and Marxism (ibid: 100).7
The sense that Payne is situated in and shoring up the space dominated and 
defined  by  the  pseudo-debate  between  neo-realism  and  neoliberalism  is 
6 This could admittedly be difficult, as Held et al (1999: 3-5), the source of this 
thoroughly mystifying contrast, can offer only William Greider (a radical journalist 
rather than a Marxist of any variety) to represent the “radicals or neo-Marxists” who 
exhibit the symptoms of this condition. Payne (2005a: 29) echoes this directly.
7 His further comment that  “to all intents and purposes they live on now only within the 
academy, and generally in remote and marginal parts even of these circuits” (ibid), 
simultaneously celebrates the global neoliberal counter-revolution, and continues the 
role of the mainstream academy in distorting, neutralising and dismissing Marxist 
critique in its service.  If we accept Payne's conclusion that “Ideologically, the global 
order danced increasingly to the tunes of one powerful country over the 1980s and 
1990s” (ibid: 238), we should clearly also acknowledge the complicity of the academy 
in this process (for a case in point, see Cammack, 1989).
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reinforced by the fact that the contending ideas he contrasts are the Third Way, 
the post-Washington consensus and neo-conservatism (ibid: 79-95), with a brief 
coda on (non-Marxist) 'radical challenges' that turn out to “make a firm bow to 
the neoliberal view of development”, and so “are perhaps not radical at all” (ibid: 
97).  The  strategy  is  transparent.  Truly  critical  approaches are  excluded,  and 
timid alternatives that are hegemonised by the mainstream are included in a 
manner that reinforces its hegemony. Supposedly critical theory is reduced to 
reinforcing  the  message that  there  is  no alternative.  This  is  all  the  more  so 
because Payne adopts the first  part  of  Cox's  analytical  framework – material 
capabilities, ideas, and institutions – but drops the crucial second part – social 
forces, forms of state and world orders. The  immediate  upshot  is that the link 
between  states  and  social  forces  (in  which  all  the  radical  potential  of  Cox's 
approach lay) is lost. Payne  starts with states, and their material capabilities, 
and produces  an account  which  emphasises  variations  in  wealth,  power,  and 
trajectories of national development, but removes any notion of government as a 
class project. In the best pluralist tradition, states are assumed to be seeking to 
govern on behalf of all their citizens:
To sum up these claims, then, development can be redefined for the 
contemporary era as the collective building by the constituent social 
and political  actors of  a  country (or at  least  in the first  instance a 
country) of a viable, functioning political economy, grounded in at least 
a measure of congruence between its core domestic characteristics and 
attributes and its location within a globalizing world order, and capable 
on that basis of advancing the material well-being of those living within 
its confines (ibid: 41; repeated 234).
Rather  than  'watery  Marxism',  this  is  a  form of  liberal  pluralism  that  soon 
collapses into realism. Payne reaches the conclusion that “all countries in the 
world  should  be seen as  having  to pursue development”  (ibid:  234).  But  he 
refuses  to  explore  the  domestic  content  and  implications  of  the  forms  of 
development that are pursued. Instead, his review of material capabilities, ideas 
and  institutions  is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  three  areas  of  “contemporary 
development  diplomacy”:  finance,  trade  and  the  environment.  Foreign  direct 
investment is not addressed in the discussion of finance, nor are the  domestic 
aspects and consequences of adherence to financial and monetary orthodoxy; 
and there  is  no  analysis  of  transnational  corporations,  nor  of  the  process  of 
production in  any country in the world, or the social relations and institutional 
arrangements (such as labour market and welfare reform) in which it is set. In 
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sum,  Payne  argues  that  all  countries  are  equally  pursuing  development,  but 
some are more equal than others.  But in a striking step backwards from the 
original Coxian framework and from what was the founding principle of critical 
IPE, he steadfastly observes the realist injunction to respect the division between 
international and domestic politics. This in turn robs his insistence that we must 
“bring  inequality  fully into the discussion by thinking of it as something that is 
fundamentally  constitutive of  contemporary global  politics”  (ibid:  245) of  any 
critical force: it is immediately glossed as meaning that “marked inequalities of 
power of both a structural and an agential nature limit the capacity of countries 
to  pursue  and  deliver  successfully  their  preferred  national  development 
strategies” (ibid). As Payne himself notes a few pages earlier, “one of the axioms 
of  the  realist  view  of  international  politics  has  always  been  that  it  is  the 
disparities of power between states that determine outcomes” (ibid: 240). He 
ends,  therefore,  in concordance with the realists  Cox set  out to challenge in 
1981. 
Why has this happened? Why have proponents of critical IPE been unable either 
to establish a productive research agenda of their own, or to recognise, let alone 
challenge, the purposive agenda of their 'problem-solving' counterparts? I offer 
the following explanation. They have been more concerned either with pitching 
theory against theory, or with disputing the academic/institutional terrain of US 
IR/IPE (dazzled, as it were, by the attributes and trappings of imperial power) 
than with pursuing their own project. As a result, they have not pursued the 
implications of the “internationalization of the state” in the post-war period, but 
rather left that project in the hands of the problem-solvers themselves. 
In their haste to avoid what would indeed be a functionalist and determinist 
conception  of  the  inevitable  evolution  of  the  global  system towards  a  single 
borderless neoliberal market, they have failed to identify what should be their 
object  of  study  –  the  strong  and  simultaneously  fundamentally  contradictory 
structural pressures towards a global regime of capitalist competitiveness that a 
contemporary Marxist or new materialist analysis identifies, along with the social 
and political conflicts which are inherent in and constitutive of them,  and the 
purposive actions of 'problem-solving' individuals and institutions intended both 
to promote competitiveness and to contain as far as possible its contradictions.8 
By preserving realist IR as a point of reference, and declaring off limits studies of 
8 See Charnock, forthcoming, for an appraisal of debates within contemporary Marxism.
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the global political economy that give pride of place from the outset to the links 
between  class,  states  and  capitalist  accumulation  in  the  analysis  of  global 
governance,  they  have  surrendered what  potential  there  might  have  been in 
critical IPE for a radical challenge to the mainstream. As a result, they have no 
better claim to survive than does the mainstream field itself.
Conclusion
The history of IPE as a field of study is transparent. It was created within the 
mainstream US IR academy as a project  on the part  of  a group of  'younger 
scholars'  to invent  and occupy new and strategic  institutional  terrain,  and its 
objective since then has been to maintain itself and expand as a field in which 
the US academy remains hegemonic. It therefore tells us much more about the 
strategic career choices of a generation of US-based academics than about the 
workings  of  the  global  political  economy.  Its  development  has  been  shaped, 
therefore, by gate-keeping and the pursuit of power and empire. In a first phase, 
the  field  was  constructed  as  a  debate  between  neorealism  and  liberal 
institutionalism;  it  was  accepted  that  domestic  politics  could  shape  the 
preferences of states in the global arena, but class analysis was ruled out. During 
this phase, Marxism was construed as dependency theory, and dismissed on the 
grounds that it failed as predictive science. The gate-keepers were perfectly well 
aware  that  Marxism  focused  more  on  class,  exploitation  and  capitalist 
accumulation  than  on  the  state-centred  caricature  of  dependency  theory 
constructed as their target in IPE, but exercised their hegemonic right to take no 
notice. When 'Marxism' was re-admitted, it was in the attenuated form of neo-
Gramscianism. At a second stage, neorealism and liberal institutionalism were 
unceremoniously  dropped  as  poles  of  the  debate,  and  the  field  was  hastily 
reconstructed around the twin poles of rationalism and constructivism, with the 
transparent objective of declaring 'post-modernism' off limits. 
All this was candidly spelled out on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of 
International  Organization,  an  occasion  that  only  accentuated  the  principal 
motive  for  the  whole  enterprise  –  to  place  themselves  at  the  centre  of  the 
narrative and to establish and preserve their hegemony.9 This fiftieth anniversary 
confessional came a decade after a previous gate-keeping effort by Keohane as 
President  of  the  International  Studies  Association,  in  which  he  argued  that 
9 Katzenstein et al (1998). The narrative is structured as it is, they say, “because it 
reflects important aspects of our own intellectual autobiographies” (ibid: 683).
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rationalism  had  generated  “a  considerable  number  of  interesting,  but  still 
untested hypotheses”  (cited in  Smith,  2000:  386).  A decade later  they were 
unconcerned by the failure of mainstream IPE in any of its variants to produce 
any findings of value, either for positivist  social  science or for policy-makers: 
they concluded, on the basis of their exhaustive survey, that their substantive 
findings  remained  meagre,  that  counter-intuitive,  well-documented  causal 
arguments  were  rare,  and  that  it  was  actually  impossible  to  make  “strong 
predictions”; and admitted (unsurprisingly) that “they could not “point to clear 
scientific 'findings' [a use of scare-quotes that has a whiff of the post-modern 
about it] about cause and effect that policymakers can readily apply” (ibid: 683-
4). Even so, they retained “the use of evidence to adjudicate truth claims” (ibid: 
678) as a handy stick with which to beat post-modernism. The authors were 
unconcerned, either, by the fact that the switch to rationalism and constructivism 
–  neither  of  which  had  any  particular  connection  with  international  political 
economy – simply dissolved the field back into US social science, and thereby 
wrote the epitaph of 'American' IPE. Fast forward to the inaugural lecture offered 
by Benjamin Cohen to the International Political Economy Society at Princeton 
University in November 2006, and we find not a proclamation of the intellectual 
contributions of US IPE, but a straightforward celebration of its creation of the 
field as an end itself: 
Recognized  standards  come  to  be  employed  to  train  and  certify 
specialists;  full-time  employment  opportunities  become  available  in 
university teaching and research; learned societies are established to 
promote study and dialogue; and publishing venues become available 
to  help  disseminate  new  ideas  and  analysis.  In  short,  an 
institutionalized  network  of  scholars  comes  into  being,  a  distinct 
research community  with  its  own boundaries,  rewards,  and careers 
(Cohen, 2007: 197). 
In defence of this empire, Cohen proposes a marriage of convenience between 
'American'  and 'British'  IPE –  alliance  politics  in  the  age old  tradition  of  the 
pursuit of power as the principal objective, the intention being to prolong the 
reach and the hegemony of  US IPE by absorbing British IPE into its  project. 
Proof, if it were needed, that the principal and perhaps only achievement of US 
has been to conquer the institutional terrain which it inhabits, and that its only 
raison  d'être is  to  retain  it.  The  preferable  alternative  for  IPE,  whether 
mainstream, critical, or globalized, is to bury it.
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